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“Thank God We’re Here”: Judicial 
Exclusivity in Charter Interpretation 
and Its Consequences 
Grant A. Huscroft* 
I hope we are not pushing too many problems that are too complex 
into the courts. We are having thrust upon us many policy issues of 
profound importance left unresolved by the other branches of 
government. People in increasing numbers are coming to the courts for 
the assertion of rights to political, economic, and social equality.  The 
courts cannot shy away from decision-making on controversial 
questions. The judges have tenure and they must give some answer, 
right or wrong; from the judicial system people expect, and get, in the 
words of one observer, “enforced fairness”. It is presumably easier and 
cheaper to look to the courts for social changes than to go through the 
laborious and time-consuming process of persuading legislators. 
Litigation is being substituted for politics; the judicial process for the 
political process.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The concern underlying this quotation is a familiar one. It has been 
raised with increasing frequency, as more and more issues have become 
the subject of Charter litigation. It underlies the complaint of “judicial 
activism” that is so often heard. 
It comes as a surprise, then, to learn not only that the concern was 
expressed by (then) Justice Dickson, but that it was expressed in 1983 
— prior to the first wave of Charter litigation reaching the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                
*  Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. Thanks to Chris Cheung and Josh 
Sidsworth for their research assistance and helpful comments. Thanks also to James Allan, 
Rob Frater, Joanna Harrington, and Paul Rishworth, who commented on earlier drafts. 
1  Dickson, “The Public Responsibilities of Lawyers” (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 175, at 187 
[internal footnote omitted]. 
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Court of Canada. Whatever he may have thought then,2 any diffidence 
he had about the role of the Court soon gave way to confidence, not 
only in the Court’s ability to resolve complex issues of profound impor-
tance but in its legitimacy in doing so. Dickson’s legacy is his Charter 
jurisprudence, which embraced the Charter and the possibilities it pre-
sented, and established the Court as the “guardian of the constitution.”3  
Has judicial review been substituted for the political process in the 
Charter era? How are we to judge? The debate over judicial activism 
cannot be won or lost on the basis of statistical analysis. It might be 
asked whether it is a debate worth having at all. After all, once it is 
acknowledged that it is the Court’s responsibility to redress violations of 
the Charter, it follows that the Court must strike down legislation at 
least some of the time. If it does so having interpreted the Charter cor-
rectly, then complaints that it does so too often are really beside the 
point. On the other hand, if the Court interprets the Charter incorrectly, 
then decisions striking down legislation are properly criticized on this 
basis, whether they be many or few.4 
This is not a satisfactory answer to the debate over judicial activism, 
however, because the premises are problematic. It is meaningless to 
speak in terms of “correct” and “incorrect” Charter interpretation. Even 
                                                                                                                                
2  The quoted passage follows a lengthy discussion of the importance of the Charter 
and the Court’s new responsibilities. On one hand, Dickson J. lamented the failure of the 
Court under the Canadian Bill of Rights [S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III], 
caused by concern about the legitimacy of judicial review. “That thinking and those misgiv-
ings are now behind us,” he wrote (at 185). He acknowledged how much about the Charter 
“depends upon how it is interpreted” and, while urging “reasonable sense, restraint and self-
control,” emphasized the need for generosity in interpretation (at 186). On the other hand, in 
the passage quoted above, he appeared to be concerned about the Court’s ability to deal with 
complex policy issues that are being forced upon it, and about the wisdom of substituting 
litigation for the political process. 
3  Hunter v. Southam (sub nom. Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Com-
bines Investigation Branch) v. Southam Inc.), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 [hereinafter 
“Hunter”].  
4  Sujit Choudhry and Claire Hunter acknowledge that “a proper definition of the rate 
of activism would be as follows: the percentage of cases that governments lose, less the 
percentage of cases that governments should lose.” Nevertheless, they proceed to analyze 
judicial activism on the basis that any second guessing of legislatures constitutes activism, 
and conclude that “[t]he question should no longer be merely whether judicial activism is 
good, but also whether judicial activism is real.” See “Measuring Judicial Activism on the 
Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE” (2003) 
48 McGill L.J. 525, at 533 and 557. 
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if we assume, as Ronald Dworkin argues, that right answers exist,5 as 
Jeremy Waldron has argued we have no way of determining what they 
are; it will always be reasonable to disagree about the meaning of rights 
and what they require in particular circumstances.6 Whether one thinks 
that there is too much or too little judicial review depends ultimately 
upon normative assumptions about the bounds of the political and legal 
processes — what is properly a matter for the people, on one hand, 
versus the courts on the other. Here too, reasonable disagreement is 
inevitable. 
Faced with these sorts of disagreements, the way in which the Su-
preme Court, Parliament, and the provincial legislatures perceive their 
roles under the Charter is obviously of crucial importance. At the outset 
of our second generation under the Charter, the Court’s role is clear: it 
has claimed the role of “guardian of the constitution.” For their parts, 
however, neither Parliament nor the provincial legislatures have asserted 
any claim to authority where the Charter is concerned. On the contrary, 
judicial exclusivity in Charter interpretation is a norm that has been 
factored into political deliberations. Only a few years following Dickson 
C.J.’s retirement his successor, Lamer C.J., took the offensive in re-
sponding to the charge of judicial activism by pointing this out: 
Thank God we’re here. It’s not for me to criticize legislators but if 
they choose not to legislate, that’s their doing. If they prefer to leave it 
up to the court that’s their choice. But a problem is not going to go 
away because legislators aren’t dealing with it. People say we’re 
activist, but we’re doing our job.7 
                                                                                                                                
5  Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), at 119. 
6  Reasonable disagreement about rights is a recurring theme in Waldron’s work. See 
Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 10-17 and 221-31. As 
Waldron says in “Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators” in Brodie & 
Huscroft (eds.), Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2004) at 11-12: 
The assumption of disagreement has nothing to do with moral relativism or non-
cognitivism. It is perfectly compatible with there being a truth of the matter about 
rights and the principles of constitutionalism — only, it assumes that our condition is 
not one in which the truth of the matter discloses itself in ways that are not reasonably 
deniable. 
7  Tibbetts, “Politicians Duck Divisive Issues, Chief Justice says” The National Post 
(12 July 1999) A1. 
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These comments confirm that judicial review has been substituted 
for the political process. According to Lamer C.J., however, responsibil-
ity for the substitution lies with politicians rather than the Court. Cana-
dians are fortunate, in his view, to have a court willing to do its job 
when politicians cannot be counted upon to do theirs. 
Political inertia on rights-based issues is a problem in my view, but 
the Court is as much part of the problem as the solution. The pending 
reference to the Supreme Court on same-sex marriage provides a clear 
demonstration of the problem. It also provides an important opportunity 
for the Court to consider the importance of institutional roles where the 
Charter is concerned, and the debilitating effect judicial exclusivity in 
Charter interpretation can have on the political process. 
II.  ESTABLISHING THE COURT’S INTERPRETIVE MONOPOLY 
The focus of constitutional law in the Charter era is undoubtedly the 
Supreme Court. Its decisions are studied not only to determine the cur-
rent state of the law but to attempt to predict its future trajectory. Will 
the Court announce new analogous grounds of discrimination under 
section 15(1)? Will it expand the concept of fundamental justice under 
section 7, or broaden the scope of the right with new interpretations of 
life, liberty, or security of the person? Preoccupation with these sorts of 
questions is a natural consequence of the Court’s commitment to pro-
gressive interpretation. Concern with future appointments to the Court is 
another such consequence. With so much at stake, the composition of 
the Court matters more than ever before.8 
There seems little support for the idea that the legislative branch of 
government has a role to play in interpreting the Charter. The question 
“whether legislatures are suited to interpreting the rights of minorities 
and the accused and long term fundamental values”9 is asked rhetori-
cally. Why is this so? 
                                                                                                                                
8  At time of writing, two appointments to the Court were pending, and speculation 
about who might be appointed was common, not only amongst lawyers but the public as well. 
See Makin, “All bets off in top-court race” The Globe and Mail (3 May 2004) A5, establish-
ing odds on a number of oft-discussed appointment possibilities. 
9  In Roach’s view, “[t]he track record of legislatures on Charter issues is not strong.” 
Roach, “Dialogic Review and its Critics” in Constitutionalism in the Charter Era, supra, note 
6, at 53.  
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1. Asserting the Need for Judicial Interpretation 
The starting point is the widely held assumption that legislatures are 
the enemy of rights. It follows that they cannot be allowed to determine 
the answers to rights-based questions. As well, it is usually assumed that 
rights analysis is beyond their ken. Kent Roach sums up these points as 
follows: “[t]he dangers are not only that legislatures will gang up on the 
unpopular and act as a judge in their own majoritarian causes, but also  
that they will avoid or finesse issues of principle.”10 This is the old “tyr-
anny of the majority” argument along with an appeal to the nemo iudex 
in sua causa principle, casually made as though there is no rejoinder.11 
So great is the rhetorical force of this argument that it causes the defi-
ciencies in judicial review to be overlooked or even ignored. It is con-
sidered better for the Court to decide Charter questions, even at the cost 
of erroneous decisions from time to time, than to risk the spectre of 
majoritarian excess. 
                                                                                                                                
10  Id. 
11  Jeremy Waldron provides the rejoinder in Law and Disagreement, supra, note 6, at 
296-301. Critiquing Dworkin’s argument in Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the 
American Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Waldron says: 
Unless we envisage a literally endless chain of appeals, there will always be some 
person or institution whose decision is final. And of that person or institution, we can 
always say that since it has the last word, its members are ipso facto ruling on the ac-
ceptability of their own view. Facile invocations of nemo iudex in sua causa are no 
excuse for forgetting the elementary logic of authority: people disagree and there is a 
need for a final decision and a final decision-procedure [at 297].… 
Sometimes we talk carelessly as though there were a special problem for the le-
gitimacy of popular majority decision-making, a problem that does not exist for other 
forms of political organization such as aristocracy or judicial rule. Because the phrase 
“tyranny of the majority” trips so easily off the tongue, we tend to forget about other 
forms of tyranny; we tend to forget that legitimacy is an issue that pertains to all po-
litical authority. Indeed it would be very odd if there were a graver problem of legiti-
macy for popular majoritarian decision-making. Other political systems have all the 
legitimacy-related dangers of popular majoritarianism: they may get things wrong; 
they may have an unjust impact on particular individuals or groups; in short, they may 
act tyrannically. But they have in addition one legitimacy-related defect that popular 
majoritarianism does not have: they do not allow a voice and a vote in a final decision-
making procedure to every citizen of the society; instead they proceed to make final 
decisions about the rights of millions on the basis of the voices and votes of a few [at 
299]. 
246  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
2. Asserting Judicial Review’s Democratic Credentials 
It is an “ineluctable reality” Alexander Bickel wrote, that judicial 
review is a counter-majoritarian force: “when the Supreme Court de-
clares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected execu-
tive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here 
and now … [J]udicial review is a deviant institution in the American 
democracy.”12 
The counter-majoritarian objection to judicial review continues to 
animate American thinking about the topic, even two centuries after the 
United States Supreme Court asserted its constitutional authority in 
Marbury v. Madison.13 Whatever might be said about the origins of 
judicial review under the U.S. Bill of Rights, however, the Charter spe-
cifically empowers courts to strike down legislation. It is supposed to be 
a counter-majoritarian instrument14 and, what is more, it was enacted 
pursuant to democratic processes. Far from being a deviant institution in 
Canadian democracy, judicial review is said to have a democratic pedi-
gree.15 As Justice Bertha Wilson put it: 
What right have [judges] to frustrate the will of the people’s duly 
elected representatives? None, I would say, except for the fact that in 
                                                                                                                                
12  Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962), at 16-18. The extraordinary nature of 
judicial review is a common feature of American scholarship. As Fred Schauer has observed, 
Americans regard judicial review as legitimate on the understanding that it is “an exceptional 
event,” and the Court’s power is to be exercised “only with the greatest reluctance” (Schauer, 
“Ashwander Revisited” (1995) Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, at 71). 
13  5 U.S. 137 (1803). Numerous articles were written on the two-hundredth anniver-
sary of Marbury v. Madison. The Wake Forest Law Review devoted its Summer 2003 issue 
to the case. 
14  Jeremy Waldron points out that the term counter-majoritarian is misleading, since it 
overlooks the fact that courts, like legislatures, operate on the basis of a bare majority vote. 
See “Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators,” supra, note 6, at 27.  
15  Jeremy Waldron objects to the suggestion that judicial review is democratic because 
it was the result of democratic process:  
[I]f the people want a regime of constitutional rights, then that is what they 
should have: democracy requires that. But we must not confuse the reason for carrying 
out a proposal with the character of the proposal itself. If the people wanted to ex-
periment with a dictatorship, principles of democracy might give us a reason to allow 
them to do so. But it would not follow that dictatorship is democratic. 
 “A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights” (1993) O.J.L.S. 18, at 46. 
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enacting the Charter these same duly elected representatives conferred 
not just that right but that duty upon them.16 
In addition to emphasizing the democratic nature of the Court’s 
mandate, Supreme Court Justices have usually sought to downplay their 
powers, or professed a lack of interest in them. Chief Justice Dickson 
emphasized the Court’s role as dutiful servant, describing the Charter as 
something the judges “did not ask for,” but had “thrust upon us.”17 Ac-
cording to McLachlin C.J., “[t]here is no evidence that judges, individu-
ally or collectively, particularly wanted the Charter.”18 
3. The Impact of Living Tree Constitutionalism 
Living tree constitutionalism — the idea that the Canadian Constitu-
tion is “capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits”19 — 
emphasizes the importance of the interpreted Charter, and in particular 
Ronald Dworkin’s conception of judicial review. Dworkin suggested in 
Law’s Empire that the task of interpreting constitutions is like the writ-
ing of a chain novel, each judge adding to the constitutional story with 
his or her interpretations of the text. Judges are constrained by the “di-
mension of fit,” according to Dworkin, and must choose from amongst 
                                                                                                                                
16  Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” in Howe & Russell (eds.), Judicial Power and Ca-
nadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 73, at 75. The argu-
ment from the Charter’s democratic origin is sometimes invoked by politicians to tout the 
democratic credentials of Charter decisions they support. Following the government’s deci-
sion not to appeal the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern v. Canada (Attorney 
General) (sub nom. Halpern v. Toronto (City); Halpern v. Ontario) (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161, 
225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (C.A.), establishing same-sex marriage, then-Justice Minister Martin 
Cauchon stated: “Let us remember that the Charter was not put in place by the judiciary. Its 
adoption in 1982 was a political decision following a heated debate in Parliament.” Campbell 
Clark, Jane Taber & Tu Thanh Ha, “Chrétien Prepares Pivotal Speech” The Globe and Mail 
(19 August 2003) A1. 
17  Quoted in Sharpe & Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2003), at 380. Justice Bertha Wilson makes the same point in an article 
aptly titled “We Didn’t Volunteer,” supra, note 16. 
18  McLachlin, “Courts, Legislatures and Executives in the Post-Charter Era” in Judi-
cial Power and Canadian Democracy, supra, note 16, 63, at 68. 
19  Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124, at 136, per Lord Sankey 
(P.C.). 
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the possible interpretations the one that “makes the work in progress 
best, all things considered.”20 
The obvious complaint about this conception of judicial review is 
that it begs the question as to the proper role of a judge engaged in con-
stitutional adjudication.21 In Richard Posner’s view, Dworkin’s chain 
novel analogy fails because it gives judges too much power:  
[D]ecisions interpreting an authoritative legal text … inherently stand 
on a different, and lower level than the text. Only the text is fully 
authentic; all the interpretive decisions must return Antaeus-like to the 
text for life-giving strength. Dworkin’s analogy equates the judges 
who interpret the Constitution to the framers of the Constitution.22 
This is a powerful criticism in the United States but in Canada it is 
not. Dworkin’s chain novel analogy is an apt description of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s approach to Charter interpretation,23 which empha-
sizes the importance of progressive interpretation of the Charter over the 
text itself, along with the intentions of those who drafted it and their 
understandings of it. The Court’s approach in Figueroa v. Canada (At-
torney General)24 is typical. There, an ostensibly simple right — the 
                                                                                                                                
20  Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), at 228-38. Dworkin 
discusses the moral reading theory of constitutional interpretation and the requirement of 
“constitutional integrity” in Freedom’s Law, supra, note 11, at Ch. 1. 
21  As Michael McConnell has written: 
Why does [Dworkin] assign the role of “author” to the judge? In the context of 
law making subject to constitutional judicial review, it seems more accurate to view 
the various legislative, executive, and common law decision makers as the authors, 
and to view judges as editors or referees. The judges’ task, it seems, is to ensure that 
the author of each chapter conforms to the rules of chain novel writing, not to write the 
books themselves.  
McConnell, “The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald 
Dworkin’s ‘Moral Reading’ of the Constitution” (1997) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, at 1274.  
22  Posner, Law and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed., 1998), 
at 246. Posner adds that as Dworkin defines it, the chain novel  
places no constraint on the authors of subsequent chapters. Each author can in the 
first sentence of his chapter kill off all the existing characters and start anew. Of 
course this would not be thought cricket, but that just means that the writing of a chain 
novel is a more complex practice than Dworkin’s description of it. It is thus unclear to 
what exactly he is analogizing the legal interpretive process [id.]. 
23  Justice Bertha Wilson has referred to Dworkin’s metaphor with approval in extraju-
dicial writing. See “The Making of a Constitution: Approaches to Judicial Interpretation” 
[1988] P.L. 370, at 373. (“The Constitution is always unfinished and is always evolving.”) 
24  [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, [2003] S.C.J. No. 37. 
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right to vote and to run for office (section 3) — was interpreted by the 
majority of the Court as requiring “effective representation,”25 thus 
rendering legislation governing political party status and privileges 
unconstitutional. Justice Iacobucci acknowledged the narrowness of the 
right but said that it was only narrow “[o]n its face,” adding that Charter 
analysis “requires courts to look beyond the words of the section.”26 On 
this approach, many chapters of the Charter story remain to be written 
by the Court. Echoing Dworkin, McLachlin C.J. has described the Char-
ter as “a work in progress.”27 
4. Equating the Court’s Decisions with the Charter Itself 
Once the need for judicial interpretation of the Charter, the democ-
ratic legitimacy of judicial review, and the Court’s interpretive discre-
tion have been established, it seems natural to equate the Court’s 
decisions interpreting the Charter with the Charter itself. This equation 
is captured in former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Hughes’ aphorism: “We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is 
what the judges say it is.”28 
Ontario Chief Justice McMurtry has invoked Hughes in explaining 
judicial review under the Charter,29 and Hughes is often cited by legal 
scholars as well.30 Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell are forthright in 
                                                                                                                                
25  The concept of “effective representation” was first invoked in Reference re Elec-
toral Boundaries Commission Act ss. 14, 20 (Saskatchewan) (sub nom. Reference re Provin-
cial Electoral Boundaries), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, to limit the scope of 
the right to vote by not requiring parity of voting power across electoral boundaries. 
26  Supra, note 24, at para. 19. 
27  I criticize this conception in “A Constitutional Work in Progress? The Charter and 
the Limits of Progressive Interpretation” in Constitutionalism in the Charter Era, supra, note 
6, at 413. 
28  Hughes, Speech before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce, May 3, 1907, in Ad-
dresses and Papers of Charles Evans Hughes, Governor of New York, 1906-1908 (New York: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1908) 133, at 139. I am grateful to Richard Friedman of the University 
of Michigan Faculty of Law for a discussion of Hughes and his famous remarks, and help 
with the references here. 
29  Speech by Chief Justice of Ontario, Roy McMurtry (August 26, 2003, Ontario Jus-
tice Education Network, University of Western Ontario). 
30  Hughes’ quotation is used to explain interpretive discretion in Hogg, Constitutional 
Law of Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough: Carswell, 1997), at ch. 5.5(b). John Saywell’s 
summation of the history of Canadian federalism echoes Hughes’ remarks: “[T]he law of the 
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observing that “judges have a great deal of discretion in ‘interpreting’ 
the law of the constitution, and the process of interpretation inevitably 
remakes the constitution into the likeness favoured by the judges.”31 
Originalists find this anathema,32 of course, yet in Canada it appears to 
be uncontroversial, as though it is the obvious consequence of the deci-
sion to adopt the Charter. 
Hughes’ remark is not an accurate description of American constitu-
tionalism. In fairness to Hughes, however, it wasn’t proffered as such.33 
Nor was his remark even made while he was a judge. Hughes made the 
remark in a speech he gave as a candidate for governor of New York, 
well prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court.34 In response to 
criticism of public service administration, Hughes is said to have aban-
doned his prepared text and made the following remarks: 
I have the highest regard for the courts. My whole life has been spent 
in work conditioned upon respect for the courts. I reckon him one of 
the worst enemies of the community who will talk lightly of the 
dignity of the bench. We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution 
is what the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the safeguard of our 
                                                                                                                                
constitution is what the judicial lawmakers have said it is, and will be what they say it may 
be.”: The Lawmakers (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 2002), at 309. 
31  Hogg & Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 
35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75, at 77. 
32  Most prominently United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. See Scalia, 
A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 1997), at 
41-47; Scalia, “The Bill of Rights: Confirmation of Extant Freedoms or Invitation to Judicial 
Creation?” in Huscroft & Rishworth (eds.), Litigating Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), 
at 19; and Scalia, “Romancing the Constitution: Interpretation as Invention” in Constitution-
alism in the Charter Era, supra, note 6. 
33  Hughes’ biographers record that he was troubled by the use to which his remarks 
were put: 
Through the remainder of his life he was to hear and see this casual phrase, torn 
from the context of an extemporaneous speech, repeated again and again as if he had, 
in a moment of candor, exposed the solemn function of judging as a sort of humbug-
gery. Of course he had done nothing of the sort. “The inference that I was picturing 
constitutional interpretation by the courts as a matter of judicial caprice,” he wrote in 
his Biographical Notes, “ … was farthest from my thought…” 
Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, Vol. I (New York: Macmillan Group, 1951), at 204. 
34  Hughes served as governor of New York for two terms before being appointed an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1910. He resigned from the Court in 1916, ran for 
President and lost, but returned to the Court in 1930 as Chief Justice.35  Hughes was speak-
ing on the Public-Service Commissions bill, which was criticized by John Stanchfield, a 
political opponent. Supra, note 28, at 133 and 139. 
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liberty and of our property under the Constitution. I do not want to see 
any direct assault upon the courts, nor do I want to see any indirect 
assault upon the courts. And I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, no more 
insidious assault could be made upon the independence and esteem of 
the judiciary than to burden it with these questions of administration 
— questions which lie close to the public impatience, and in regard to 
which the people are going to insist on having administration by 
officers directly accountable to them. 
Let us keep the courts for the questions they were intended to consider 
...35 
Hughes was explaining, in other words, why it was appropriate to keep 
matters of administration out of the courts. He considered that the courts 
should not have to waste time on such matters when it had more impor-
tant things to do.36 
The U.S. Supreme Court has rarely asserted the power Hughes’ 
aphorism suggests.37 On the contrary, the view that constitutional inter-
pretation is a shared enterprise is mainstream in the United States. Laur-
ence Tribe makes this point rhetorically: 
What if, for example, Congress enacted a law (over the President’s 
veto) ordering the imprisonment or summary execution of a suspected 
terrorist by name and a politicized Supreme Court upheld it? Shouldn’t 
the President have the power — even the duty — to refuse to carry out 
the sentence? Similarly, suppose that in the year 1863 the same 
Supreme Court that decided Dred Scott ruled that the emancipation 
proclamation was unconstitutional as a taking of property. Would 
Lincoln have been obligated to return freed blacks to slavery? These 
examples illustrate the gravity of the separate oath requirement that the 
                                                                                                                                
36  Hughes continued:  
You must have administration, and you must have administration by administra-
tive officers. … Under the proper maintenance of your system of government and in 
view of the wide extension of regulating schemes which the future is destined to see, 
you cannot afford to have that administration by your courts. Supra, note 28, at 141. 
37  The paradigm exception is Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), in which the Court 
pronounced that it was “supreme in the exposition” of the Constitution (at 18). See Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2000), at 254-58, describing the 
Court’s claim of constitutional supremacy as “quite understandable given the open state 
resistance to the principles announced in Brown,” and noting that “subsequent assertions of 
ultimate authority have tended to be more restrained” (at 255-56). 
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Constitution imposes on the President … and the legitimacy of 
differing interpretations of the Constitution itself.38 
Thus, in regard to American law Hughes’ remark is more aptly de-
scribed as a quip.39 Yet, it has considerable force as a description, and 
for some a normative conception, of Canadian constitutionalism. Cana-
dian governments have never had a Dred Scott40 or a Lochner41 moment 
to deal with; they have not had to issue a direct challenge to the Court or 
its decisions.42 Nor has there been anything like the willful disobedience 
that followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.43 On the contrary, as we will see, Canadian governments 
have built judicial exclusivity in interpreting the Charter into their po-
litical plans. 
                                                                                                                                
38  Tribe, id., at 266-67. See also Devins & Fisher, “Judicial Exclusivity and Political 
Instability,” (1998) 84 Va. L. Rev. 83, and Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the 
Courts (1999) 6-32. Cf. Alexander & Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpreta-
tion” (1997) 110 Harv L. Rev. 1359, and “Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply” (2000) 
17 Const. Commentary 455; and Farber, “The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. 
Aaron Revisited” [1982] U. Ill. L. Rev. 387. 
39  Cox, The Court and the Constitution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), at 68. Nev-
ertheless, Alexander and Schauer specifically invoke Hughes in arguing that the Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution should be understood as equivalent in status to the Constitu-
tion itself:  
We argued, to put it starkly, that “the Constitution is what the judges say it is” 
may well be bad jurisprudence because it is incomprehensible as an attempt to explain 
what it means to argue to the Supreme Court, but that it is nonetheless a desirable atti-
tude for non-judicial officials to have towards the Court and its product, in much the 
same way, but far less controversially, that it is a desirable attitude for lower court 
judges to have towards the Court and its opinions. 
 “Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply,” id., at 455. 
40  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
41  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
42  Parliament’s action following the Court’s decision in R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 
S.C.R. 411, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98 is an exception, but is not so momentous. Nevertheless, it is 
criticized strongly by Cameron, “Dialogue and Hierarchy in Charter Interpretation: A Com-
ment on R. v. Mills” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 1051. 
43  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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III.  REINFORCING JUDICIAL EXCLUSIVITY: THE POPULARITY OF 
THE COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
One of the key factors reinforcing the idea of judicial exclusivity in 
interpreting the Charter is the popularity of the Court itself. Supreme 
Court Justices are as respected and admired as politicians are distrusted 
and scorned. They are treated as celebrities, and honoured as politicians 
almost never are. Judges may not court popularity, but neither do they 
appear to discourage it.44 
It might be argued that the Court is well regarded because it de-
serves to be — that it is respected and admired for the way in which it 
has exercised its duties under the Charter. There is much to this.45 But it 
is also fair to say that popularity is a relative thing, and it is easy to be 
popular compared to politicians. In comparison to politicians, judges are 
treated almost reverentially by the media. Supreme Court Justices are 
not subject to a public vetting process prior to their appointments, and 
politicians are cautious about criticizing them once they are appointed, 
lest they be seen as undermining the independence of the judiciary. A 
                                                                                                                                
44  It is not unusual for Justices to be honoured for their work, not only in Canada but 
internationally. In 2003, the “Peter Gruber Foundation,” based in the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
awarded retired Supreme Court Justice Bertha Wilson and current Ontario Court of Appeal 
Justice Rosalie Abella its Justice Award for their work in human rights. According to the 
Gruber Foundation website, the award comes with a gold medal and a $200,000 cash award. 
See online: <http://www.petergruberfoundation.org/justice/justice_frameset.htm> (viewed 
March 29, 2004). 
 The three members of the Ontario Court of Appeal whose decision in Halpern v. 
Canada, supra, note 16, held the law of marriage unconstitutional were named “Nation 
Builders of the Year” by The Globe and Mail. They were interviewed and profiled at length, 
and posed for a full-page colour photo. See online: <http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/ 
story/RTGAM.20031212.wnat1212/BNStory/Front/> (viewed March 29, 2004). The awards 
are discussed in the “Report of the Chief Justice of Ontario Upon the Opening of the Courts 
of Ontario for 2004” online: <http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/court_of_appeal/speeches/ 
opening_speeches/coareport2004.htm>. 
45  It is common for Canadians to assume that the Supreme Court of Canada enjoys 
greater respect than its American counterpart, which is assumed to more political in nature. 
However, an Ipsos-Reid poll from 2001 found that even though 93 per cent said decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court are influenced by partisan politics, fully 64 per cent said they ap-
proved of the Court’s decisions over the past year (which included the controversial decision 
in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)), while 85 per cent said that they have respect for Su-
preme Court Justices (45 per cent have a “great deal” of respect; 40 per cent have a “fair 
amount” of respect). See Ipsos-Reid Press Release, “Supreme Decisions: Public’s view of the 
Supreme Court” (5 July 2001). 
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number of conventions operate to insulate the judiciary from the sorts of 
criticism to which politicians are subjected routinely. This needn’t be so 
— it is certainly not the case in the United States, for example — but it 
is so. Despite the nature of the task they are performing in the Charter 
era, Supreme Court Justices are presumed to be doing law rather than 
politics, and have managed to remain above the political fray as a result. 
I have no doubt that this will change in time. My point is simply that 
the popularity of the Court, combined with the unpopularity of politi-
cians, helps reinforce the idea of judicial exclusivity in interpreting the 
Charter. Chief Justice McLachlin has explicitly linked the Court’s popu-
larity to the widening scope of the tasks it is asked to fulfill. But while 
she acknowledged it was a “radical alteration in the public perception of 
the role of judges in modern society,”46 she did not deprecate it. On the 
contrary, the public’s “increasing confidence in judges to sort out soci-
ety’s problems” appears to be a matter of pride for the Chief Justice.47 
The Chief Justice is right to say that the public has increasing confi-
dence in the ability of judges to sort out society’s problems. But public 
support is no proof of the legitimacy of judicial review or its democratic 
                                                                                                                                
46  Id. 
47  McLachlin, “The Role of Judges in Modern Society” (Speech at the Fourth World-
wide Common Law Judiciary Conference, 5 May 2001). Justice Rosalie Abella of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal has also used public opinion polls to argue in support of judicial review: 
We spent the last decade listening to a chorus moaning over the fate of a majority 
whose legislatively endorsed wishes could theoretically be superceded by those of 
judges, only to learn in poll after poll that an overwhelming majority of that majority 
is happy, proud and grateful to live in a country that puts its views in perspective 
rather than in cruise control; who prefers to see judicial rights protection as a reflec-
tion of judicial integrity or independence rather than of judicial trespass or activism; 
and who understands that the plea for judicial deference may be nothing more than a 
prescription for judicial rigor mortis.  
 “Public Opinion, the Courts, and Rights: The Charter in Context” in Magnet, Beau-
doin, Gall & Manfredi (eds.), The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Reflections on 
the Charter After Twenty Years (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2003) 421, at 434.  
 Justice Abella’s assertion that “poll after poll” demonstrates overwhelming majority 
support is not supported by recent polls. An Angus Reid survey in 1999 found that while 50 
per cent considered that judges do not have too much power, 45 per cent considered that they 
do. See Makin, “Opinion mixed on power of judges” The Globe and Mail (23 November 
1999). An Ipsos-Reid poll in 2003 showed that 54 per cent thought judges have too much 
power, while 44 per cent considered that they do not (Ipsos-Reid Press Release, 10 August 
2003). This survey also revealed that 71 per cent agreed that Parliament, rather than the 
courts, should make law. Nevertheless, 78 per cent agreed that the courts had the right to 
issue legally binding decisions under the Charter. 
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credentials, just as public opposition is no proof of its illegitimacy or 
democratic failings. The Court should not shrink from upholding the 
Charter in the face of unpopularity, but nor should it infer an expanded 
mandate from its popularity. There is more to the Constitution than 
judicial review. 
IV.  JUDICIAL EXCLUSIVITY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Same-sex marriage affords a chance to move from the abstract to 
the particular in assessing the impact of judicial review, and in particular 
the consequences of judicial exclusivity in interpreting the Charter. It 
demonstrates that judicial exclusivity in interpreting the Charter is not 
only well-established as a constitutional norm, but that it has become an 
important consideration in the political process. It also demonstrates, I 
think, the way in which judicial exclusivity can have a debilitating effect 
on the political process. 
1. A Long-Developing Controversy 
Same-sex marriage has been before Canadian courts for over a dec-
ade.48 During that period, successive governments have taken the posi-
tion that the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples does not 
violate the Charter, a position that has been maintained as the Court’s 
approach to the equality right in section 15 of the Charter evolved. 
Faced with decisions precluding different treatment of same-sex couples 
in a variety of contexts, Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
amended numerous laws. Significantly, however, Parliament stopped 
short of amending the law to establish same-sex marriage. On the con-
trary, in 1999 Parliament expressly endorsed the traditional concept of 
opposite-sex marriage.49 
Litigation continued during this time, and precedents began to build 
up in the lower courts. The Ontario Divisional Court held that the com-
mon law definition of marriage infringed the Charter, but suspended the 
                                                                                                                                
48  See Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer & Commercial Relations) (1993), 14 
O.R. (3d) 658, [1993] O.J. No. 575 (Div. Ct.). 
49  Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12, s. 1.1. 
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declaration for two years to allow Parliament to respond.50 Subse-
quently, a Quebec trial court reached the same conclusion, and also 
suspended its declaration for two years.51 The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal held that the definition of marriage violated the Charter and 
suspended its declaration to coincide with the date the suspension in the 
Ontario decision was set to expire. 
The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern v. Canada52 
brought things to a head. Not only did the Court hold that the definition 
of marriage infringed the Charter, it reformulated the definition to mean 
the “voluntary union for life of two persons,” and its order was made 
effective immediately, thus pre-empting any legislative response. 
The decision in Halpern came as no surprise; same-sex marriage 
ceased to be a radical idea from the moment the first court held that the 
law of marriage violated the Charter. Nevertheless, the remedial aspect 
of Halpern came as a considerable surprise. Suspended declarations of 
Charter infringements are common,53 and the Ontario Court of Appeal 
was well aware that the issue was under political consideration at the 
highest level. A committee of Parliament had conducted national con-
sultations and was in the process of preparing a report for Parliament.54  
                                                                                                                                
50  Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 16. 
51  Hendricks v. Quebec (Procureur général), [2002] J.Q. 3816 (Sup. Ct.). The B.C. 
Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion of unconstitutionality as the Ontario Court, but 
suspended its order to allow Parliament time to respond. See EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada 
(Attorney General) (2003), 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2003] B.C.J. No. 994 (C.A.). Following the 
federal government’s announcement that it would not be appealing the decision in Halpern, 
the B.C.C.A. lifted the suspension order, and the Quebec Court of Appeal followed suit. 
52  Supra, note 16 [hereinafter “Halpern”]. 
53  In Vann Niagara Ltd v. Oakville (Town) (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 1, [2002] O.J. No. 
2323, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal held two relatively inconsequential municipal 
bylaws regulating the use of billboard advertising to be unconstitutional on the basis that they 
infringed the freedom of expression, but without discussion suspended its declaration for six 
months. (The Court’s decision on one of the bylaws was overturned on appeal to the Supreme 
Court, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 158, [2003] S.C.J. No. 71.) Bruce Ryder criticizes suspended declara-
tions of unconstitutionality in “Suspending the Charter” (2003) 21 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 267. 
54  The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights had 
been studying the possible recognition of same-sex unions since November 2002, and had 
held hearings over a period of several months. Following the decision of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in Halpern, the Committee adopted a motion to support the Court’s decision. The 
vote was 9-8, after two members of the Committee representing the government who opposed 
same-sex marriage were replaced. See Clark, “Government steers vote on accepting same-sex 
ruling” The Globe and Mail (13 June 2003). 
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It is not too much to say that the Court’s remedial order was con-
temptuous of the democratic processes that were underway. Yet no 
criticism was heard from the government on this account. The task of 
defending the role of Parliament fell to the Opposition, which opposed 
the Court’s decision and as a result had little credibility as Parliament’s 
defender. For its part, the government announced that it intended to 
legislate in accordance with the Court’s decision rather than appeal it to 
the Supreme Court of Canada. First, however, it would be submitting a 
reference to the Court, asking three questions ostensibly designed to 
clarify the issues. 
2. The Government’s Initial Response and Strategy 
The government directed a reference to the Supreme Court of Can-
ada on July 16, 2003, asking the following questions: 
Is the annexed Proposal for an Act respecting certain aspects of legal 
capacity for marriage for civil purposes within the exclusive 
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada? If not, in what 
particular or particulars, and to what extent? 
If the answer to question 1 is yes, is section 1 of the proposal, which 
extends capacity to marry to persons of the same sex, consistent with 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? If not, in what 
particular or particulars, and to what extent? 
Does the freedom of religion guaranteed by paragraph 2(a) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protect religious officials 
from being compelled to perform a marriage between two persons of 
the same sex that is contrary to their religious beliefs? 
The answers the Court will give to these reference questions are ob-
vious — specifically, yes, yes, and yes — and in normal circumstances 
there would be no reason to seek the Court’s opinion on them prior to 
legislating. These are not normal circumstances, however. An election 
was pending, and same-sex marriage is politically divisive. There is 
significant opposition to it within the government caucus; it is an issue 
that separates the government and the Opposition; and it appears to 
divide Canadians. In these circumstances, the reference serves more 
than simply legal purposes. The government is using the reference pro-
cedure to pursue its political agenda. 
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The first and third questions have not really been put into issue. The 
federal government has authority over marriage and divorce under sec-
tion 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867,55 and there is no doubt that 
this includes the question of capacity to marry.56 As for the freedom of 
religious officials to choose which marriages to sanctify, this is surely 
one of the least things that the guarantee of freedom of religion in sec-
tion 2(a) of the Charter requires, and no legislative authorization is re-
quired in order to exercise that freedom. 
The second question is simply disingenuous. There is no doubt that 
Parliament is free to legislate to create same-sex marriage should it wish 
to do so, and that it always has been. To ask the Court whether Parlia-
ment can do what it so obviously can is to feign caution where courage 
is lacking. In terms of crass partisan advantage, the government is using 
the Court to fend off political criticism and buy time. The reference 
ensures that the controversy is removed from continued political scru-
tiny in the short run. Anyone attempting to raise the matter is sure to be 
met with the refrain that it would be inappropriate to discuss the matter 
while it is before the Court. The length of time the Court can be ex-
pected to take to hear and answer the reference questions is simply an 
added bonus, given that it allowed the government to go to the polls 
before the matter could return to Parliament. 
3. Revising the Strategy 
With the end of Jean Chrétien’s leadership and the beginning of 
Paul Martin’s came a new Cabinet and a revised strategy on same-sex 
marriage, albeit to the same political end. The new Minister of Justice, 
Irwin Cotler, announced that the government remained committed to 
                                                                                                                                
55  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
56  Justice Pitfield held that the law of the Constitution Act, 1867 bars same-sex mar-
riages, and that constitutional amendment was required in order to change the concept of 
marriage — this despite submissions from both the Attorney General for British Columbia 
and the Attorney General for Canada that the opposite-sex requirement related to the capacity 
to marry falls within Parliament’s jurisdiction to legislate under s. 91(26). See EGALE Can-
ada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2001), 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122 (B.C.S.C.). On appeal, 
both Attorneys General agreed that the trial judge erred on this point. See EGALE Canada 
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), supra, note 51, at para. 11 (C.A.). The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal followed the Ontario Court of Appeal in holding that Pitfield J. 
was incorrect. 
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same-sex marriage. At the same time, however, the government was 
expanding the pending reference to include a fourth question: 
Is the opposite-sex requirement for marriage for civil purposes, as 
established by the common law and set out for Quebec in s. 5 of the 
Federal Law — Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, consistent with 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? If not, in what 
particular or particulars and to what extent? 
This is the very question that would have been answered had the 
government appealed the decision in Halpern. Not only did it not do so, 
however, it opposed those intervenors who sought standing to appeal the 
decision, and was successful in doing so.57 
The government should have appealed the decision in Halpern for 
several reasons. First, where the constitutionality of federal law is con-
cerned, it is almost invariably inappropriate for the Attorney General to 
let a provincial court of appeal have the last word. A national solution is 
required, and if the solution is to come from a court it should come from 
the highest court.58 Second, the case raises an important point about 
remedial discretion, and in particular the circumstances in which it is 
appropriate to suspend a declaration of unconstitutionality in order to 
allow a legislative response. This is a question that transcends the im-
portance of same-sex marriage, and further guidance from the Supreme 
Court would be helpful. 
The fact that the law of equality had not changed — the Court in 
Halpern was simply applying the test developed by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration)59 
— is another reason that made an appeal in Halpern appropriate. If the 
government was sincere in the position it advanced at trial and on ap-
peal, it is difficult to see why it should not have persevered. Many cases 
lost in the lower courts are won in the Supreme Court. It is possible, 
however, that the government’s heart was never in the defence of the 
                                                                                                                                
57  2003 SCCA 337. 
58  See Huscroft, “The Attorney-General and Charter Challenges to Legislation: Advo-
cate or Adjudicator” (1995) 5 N.J.C.L. 125, at 161-62, arguing that “a decision that federal 
legislation is unconstitutional should normally be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
in order to ensure the equal application of federal legislation across the provinces.” The same 
applies, in my view, where the common law is concerned. 
59  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12. 
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law. We have to consider the possibility that the decision in Halpern 
was to the government’s liking, despite the position the government 
advanced. The government had to defend the law at first instance, but 
the emphatic decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal might have galva-
nized support for same-sex marriage sufficiently to make the decision to 
legislate politically palatable, if not positively virtuous: in conceding 
defeat, the government purported to emphasize its respect for the Char-
ter. 
In any event, addition of the fourth question allowed the fundamen-
tal issue to be addressed by the Court — that is, whether the opposite-
sex requirement for marriage is inconsistent with the Charter. This gives 
objectors the day in court denied them when the government elected not 
to appeal. At the same time, it allows the government to argue against 
the constitutionality of the law it has announced its intention to amend. 
4. Selling the Strategy 
The Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotler, has sought to portray the gov-
ernment’s strategy on same-sex marriage as based in principle: 
[T]here is a third important principle, and that is the importance of a 
full and informed debate before the court, in Parliament and in 
response to concerns of the public. It is to respect that third principle 
that the Government is seeking the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Canada on a new question in the reference on civil marriage and the 
legal recognition of same-sex unions. 
In particular, the Government of Canada is seeking the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Canada on the question of whether the opposite-sex 
requirement for marriage for civil purposes is consistent with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
We understand that many Canadians are struggling with this question. 
And as a new administration, one of our key priorities is to address 
what some have termed “a democratic deficit”. 
While the Government’s position on the reference has not changed, 
adding this question will allow for a more comprehensive opinion by 
the Court, and for those groups and individuals who do not agree with 
the Government’s approach to put their case to the Court. 
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As you may know, the Supreme Court ruled last Friday that 18 groups 
and individuals can intervene. So we are sure of a full range of views 
before the Court. 
In making this decision to add a new question, the Government was 
guided by three principles - equality, religious freedom, and the 
importance of a full and informed debate before the court, in 
Parliament and in response to the concerns of Canadians on this 
important social issue. 
In summary, the Government continues to believe that the best way to 
fully respect the two fundamental Charter rights involved here - 
equality and freedom of religion - is to provide equal access to civil 
marriage for same-sex couples seeking that degree of commitment as 
other couples, while ensuring the protection of religious officials who 
refuse to perform marriage ceremonies where it would be against their 
religious beliefs. 
The final decision on this question will be made by Parliament in the 
spirit of open debate. But before that happens, we need clear advice 
from the Supreme Court on the legal framework within which choices 
must be made.60 
Consider what is going on here. The government — at the time a 
majority government, no less, with the power to amend the law on a 
party vote should it choose to do so — postponed legislating in order to 
ask the Supreme Court questions to which it knew the answers. Counsel 
will solemnly attend the hearing, and argue for the answers that the 
Minister of Justice will have advised Cabinet that the government is 
sure to receive. Then, we are told, a “full and informed debate” will 
occur, and Members of Parliament will determine what the law should 
be. Of course this is preposterous, and the availability and political at-
tractiveness of this sort of strategy is a strong argument against the exis-
tence of a reference procedure. Not only is the government’s strategy 
disingenuous politically, but it undermines the legitimacy of Parliament 
as a constitutional actor. It reinforces the idea of judicial exclusivity in 
interpreting the Charter, and suggests that political action would be 
precipitous in the absence of judicial direction. 
                                                                                                                                
60  Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler, Press Release, “Government 
of Canada Reaffirms its Position on Supreme Court Reference” (Ottawa, January 28, 2004). 
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The addition of the fourth question to the reference demonstrates the 
problem in sharp relief. The fourth question asks whether the opposite-
sex requirement for marriage is consistent with the Charter. The first 
thing to notice about this question is that it is irrelevant. If the Court 
holds that the opposite-sex marriage requirement is inconsistent with the 
Charter, that is simply a reason for the government to do what it has 
committed to do, and could already have done without the expense and 
delay the reference litigation will occasion. If, on the other hand, the 
Court answers the fourth question by stating that the opposite-sex re-
quirement does not infringe the Charter, the Government remains free to 
change the law of marriage to include same-sex couples in any event. 
The Charter is a floor, not a ceiling, for rights, and Parliament is free to 
establish greater rights protection than the Charter requires. Again, the 
Court’s decision is simply irrelevant. If the government believes in 
same-sex marriage, then there is no excuse for not legislating immedi-
ately. 
Is there room for meaningful debate in Parliament about same-sex 
marriage following the Court’s decision? If the Court advises that the 
opposite-sex requirement for marriage is inconsistent with the Charter, 
those MPs who oppose same-sex marriage will in essence be left to 
debate the Court rather than the government. Whether the Court speaks 
unanimously or through a bare majority, those who disagree can only 
prevail temporarily, and then only if they can convince Parliament to 
invoke the notwithstanding clause, thereby staving off same-sex mar-
riage for up to five years. The only way in which meaningful debate 
could occur is if the Court were to advise that Halpern was wrongly 
decided. Same-sex marriage would be seen as a political decision rather 
than a legal requirement. Despite the Justice Minister’s fine words about 
the importance of Parliament and the spirit of open debate, this is surely 
the government’s nightmare scenario. 
Fortunately for the government this will not occur. It is simply too 
late in the day for the Court to decide that limitation of marriage to 
opposite-sex couples does not infringe the Charter, even if it once might 
have done so. The government’s management of the issue has, in effect, 
precluded the possibility of any other outcome: hundreds of couples 
have married since the decision in Halpern, and hundreds more will 
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have done so by the time the Court answers the reference questions. A 
new status quo has been established, and no one should suppose that the 
Court will disturb it.61 
V.  CAN THE COURT DISCOURAGE JUDICIAL REVIEW? 
It might be objected that my concerns about judicial review and the 
role of the Court wrongly assume that the Court has a choice in the 
matter when it comes to exercising its judicial review function. It is 
often said, for example, that the Court cannot refuse to decide Charter 
issues. Chief Justice McLachlin has frequently defended the Court 
against charges of judicial activism on this basis: 
The courts cannot say, “go away, we’re not interested in your 
problem.” Nor can the courts say, the Parliamentarians debated this 
and voted, and that’s the end of the matter. It is the constitutional 
obligation of judges to hear a citizen’s complaint and to decide 
whether it is valid or not.62 
Kent Roach takes up the argument in The Supreme Court on Trial in 
a chapter titled “The Myth of Judicial Activism.” He deprecates the 
American practice of avoiding or limiting the extent of constitutional 
adjudication, a practice Alexander Bickel called the “passive virtues.”63 
There is a rich body of jurisprudence here that Roach does not consider. 
In his view, avoidance is tantamount to “ducking constitutional issues,” 
an act he equates with cowardice.64 He also equates it with the denial of 
                                                                                                                                
61  I put aside here a number of interesting questions that would arise in the event the 
Court were to hold that Halpern was wrongly decided. It is one thing to advise that a case was 
wrongly decided, but quite another to deal with rights that have been exercised in good faith 
reliance on such a decision, especially given that the government elected not to appeal. 
62  McLachlin, “Charter Myths” (1999) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23, at 31. 
63  Bickel, supra, note 12, at Ch. 4. 
64  Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue? 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 208. I say this because at several points Roach describes 
judicial decisions under the Charter as “courageous.” The Court’s decision in Burns and 
Rafay (United States v. Burns), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8: precluding extradi-
tion to face the possibility of capital punishment) is described as a “courageous and bold 
change of heart” (at 212), and a “courageous judgment” (at 213). I don’t know what it is that 
makes a judgment courageous, but I wonder whether it is appropriate to describe any judicial 
decision in these terms. 
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rights: “The Court simply must decide constitutional issues, however 
difficult or divisive they may be,” he argues, because “[d]ucking the 
issue will only delay the inevitable and often constitute an implicit and 
unjustified dismissal of the merits of the claim.”65 
I think that this puts the case too highly. If the claim is that the Su-
preme Court is powerless to do anything other than decide any constitu-
tional issue raised before it, then it is incorrect as a descriptive matter. 
For the most part, the Court controls its docket: it has a discretion to 
grant leave to appeal, and hears only those cases that it chooses to hear 
— cases that in its view raise matters of public importance.66 Chief 
Justice McLachlin’s point that “judges do not have agendas,” but simply 
“take the laws and the cases as they find them, and apply their interpre-
tative skills to them as the constitution requires,”67 may be true as far as 
the lower courts are concerned, but not the Supreme Court of Canada. In 
deciding which cases it will hear the Supreme Court sets the constitu-
tional agenda and, having done so, reserves the right to determine 
whether and how thoroughly it will deal with the issues the parties want 
to litigate. The Court has discretion as to how it chooses to deal with 
even those cases it must accept. The exercise of the Court’s discretion in 
dealing with reference questions is a prominent example here. Some of 
the most famous reference cases are those in which the Court has exer-
cised its discretion to answer questions not raised in a reference.68 The 
Court has also exercised its discretion not to answer matters raised in a 
reference.69  
The larger problem with the argument that the Court must decide 
Charter cases is the assumption that underlies it. The assumption is that 
                                                                                                                                
65  Id., at 210. 
66  The Court must hear criminal law appeals as of right in some cases, and must accept 
reference questions. In general, however, the Court decides which cases it will hear based on 
its opinion that the question raised is a matter of public importance such that it ought to be 
decided by the Court: Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 40(1).  
67  Chief Justice McLachlin, address to The Canadian Club of Toronto, Tuesday, June 
17, 2003. 
68  Prominent here are Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution (sub nom. 
Reference re Questions concerning Amendment of Constitution of Canada as set out in O.C. 
1020/80), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”], and Reference re Seces-
sion of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61. 
69  Hogg, supra, note 30, at Ch. 8.6(d). Hogg advocates that the Court exercise its dis-
cretion not to answer a reference question more often. 
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judicial decisions are necessary because the Charter has no meaning in 
the absence of judicial explication. The assumption is usually implicit 
but it is sometimes explicit, as for example when the Court justifies 
extensive obiter dicta on the basis that the parties need to know the 
law.70 More problematically, it is also justified on the basis that politi-
cians have abdicated their responsibilities.  
Recall the remarks of Lamer C.J. quoted earlier: 
Thank God we’re here. It’s not for me to criticize legislators but if 
they choose not to legislate, that’s their doing. If they prefer to leave it 
up to the court that’s their choice. But a problem is not going to go 
away because legislators aren’t dealing with it. People say we’re 
activist, but we’re doing our job.71 
The short answer to the Chief Justice is that divine providence has less 
to do with the scope of constitutional judicial review than the will of the 
Court. Legislators may well attempt to abdicate their responsibilities and 
leave matters to the Court, but the Court is a major contributor to the 
problem. In the Charter era the Court’s decisions alter the political land-
scape, and not only in respect of particular issues. They create structural 
incentives and disincentives to political action, and it ill-becomes the 
Court to affect surprise at any of this, or to express disapproval of timid 
legislatures. By being helpful or more grandly purporting to “do its 
duty” in Charter cases, the Court diminishes not only the importance of 
political resolution of rights questions but the likelihood that it will 
occur. 
                                                                                                                                
70  Sometimes this is expressed as a matter of fairness to the parties: having argued a 
matter, they deserve to have the Court answer it.  
71  Chief Justice Lamer, quoted in Tibbetts, supra, note 7. Counsel have no compunc-
tion about urging courts to resolve questions rather than leaving them to legislatures. Counsel 
for the plaintiffs in Halpern v. Canada, discussed in the text above, argued that the federal 
government had engaged in “a history of legislative denial or legislative avoidance” when it 
came to same-sex rights, and that positive change had come only as a result of pressure from 
the courts. “Do not defer to them in the hope that things will be done,” she urged. “They 
cannot be trusted.”: Kari, “Ottawa ‘can’t be trusted’ on gay marriage: lawyer” The National 
Post (24 April 2003) A11. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Historian Michael Bliss has expressed concern that the debate over 
same-sex marriage may cause a political backlash, and ultimately a 
confrontation between Parliament and the Court. According to Bliss,  
[p]oliticians simply cannot offer easy leadership on divisive social 
issues, but rather have to follow the tide of opinion, brokering 
competing positions and waiting for common denominators to 
develop. Certain problems involving conflicting claims to rights and 
privileges within society really ought to be left to the courts to sort out. 
I think the difficult question of the definition of marriage is one such 
problem.72 
It does not occur to Bliss that the problems he seeks to avoid — a politi-
cal backlash and a confrontation between Parliament and the Court — 
have been caused by the solution he advocates. Nor does it occur to him 
that removing issues from democratic deliberation may exacerbate those 
problems. One of the important lessons of American constitutional law 
is that the judiciary has less ability to resolve pressing social issues than 
is commonly supposed. It may succeed from time to time, where it is 
able to identify and reinforce a matter of societal consensus, or perhaps 
an emerging area of consensus, but for every Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion73 there is likely to be a Roe v. Wade,74 a cautionary tale about the 
exercise of judicial power. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to consti-
tutionalize the law of abortion fanned the flames of that controversy, 
and put the Court at the centre of a political debate that continues over 
thirty years later. 
If Bliss’s solution is problematic, the larger concern is that he sup-
poses there is a problem that needs to be addressed at all. The contro-
versy that accompanies the exercise of deliberative democracy is not 
something to be regretted, and avoided if possible. It is an inherent part 
of the process we need to face and resolve in order to act as a self-
governing democratic polity. Democracy is not for the faint-hearted, and 
the Court does Canadians no favours when it promotes reliance upon 
judicial review as a means of resolving difficult societal problems. The 
                                                                                                                                
72  Bliss, “Politicians Playing with Fire” The National Post (2 August 2003) A18. 
73  Supra, note 43. 
74  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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risk is that it will undermine not only our capacity but our will for po-
litical resolution. 
This risk is inherent in any system of judicial review. The American 
scholar James Bradley Thayer warned about the impact of judicial re-
view on the democratic processes over a century ago: 
The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function 
[judicial review], now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the 
political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral 
responsibility. It is no light thing to do that.75 
Thayer does not receive much attention these days, and virtually 
none in Canada. But the warning he sounded then is worth heeding now. 
In the second generation under the Charter, the challenge for the Su-
preme Court lies in ensuring that there is more to democratic constitu-
tionalism than simply judicial review. Repudiating the government’s 
political strategy in the same-sex marriage reference would be a good 
start. 
 
                                                                                                                                
75  Thayer, John Marshall (New York: Da Capo Press, 1901, reprinted 1974) at 107; 
also quoted in Bickel, supra, note 12, at 22. 
 
 
